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RECENT DECISIONS
there can be found some secondary purpose to promote public health
and safety.
However, it was held in New York, People v. Murphy, 195 N. Y.
126 affirming 129 A. D. 260 (1909), that an ordinance which limited
the height of a sky sign to nine feet was unconstitutional, but the
same court, in a later case, People v. Ludwig, 172 A. D. 71 affirmed
218 N. Y. 540, 113 N. E. 532 (1916), held that an ordinance re-
stricting the height of a sky sign to thirty-one feet in the case of solid
signs and seventy-five feet in the case of open signs was valid. This
was followed by the case of People v. Wolf, 216 N. Y. S. 741, 127
Misc. 382 (1926), which held unconstitutional a village ordinance pro-
hibiting the erection of any advertising signs except those used for
the purpose of advertising real estate, on the ground that it was not
calculated to remedy an existing evil; that it does not tend to pro-
mote public health, public safety, public morals or general welfare;
and that it is discriminatory, in that it permits one kind of advertis-
ing and prohibits all other kinds. The case of People v. Wolf, supra,
although it has not yet gone up on appeal seems to be the last word
of the New York Courts. It would, therefore, seem that there is a
serious conflict of authority as to those ordinances aesthetic in their
nature. It is submitted that the rule followed by Massachusetts,
Welch v. Swasey, supra, and Maryland; Cochran v. Preston, et al.,
supra, is the sounder one for, in time to come, courts will be compelled
to take judicial notice of the fact that a beautiful city, whose buildings
present a picture of symmetry in art and design, is as much a property
right of the city and its inhabitants as any other property right and as
such should be protected. These views were voiced by Crownhart, J.,
in a dissenting opinion in the Wisconsin case of Piper, et al., v. Ekern,
supra, in which he said: "I do not believe that the constitutionality of
the statute need rest upon the narrow ground of safety and health,
though I think them ample to sustain the present statute as an exercise
of the police power. If 'public welfare' has not done so already, it is
high time it took on a meaning for the courts which it has already done
for the rest of the world ......
INSURANCE-KNOWLEDGE OF AGENT IMPUTABLE TO PRINCIPAL.-The
defendant insurance company employed one Bowler as a soliciting
agent. Bowler took the written application of Otto Rose for insur-
ance on a threshing machine. The policy was issued upon the applica-
tion which contained a clause voiding the policy should the subject
of the insurance be or become incumbered by chattel mortgage. The
plaintiff at the time of the destruction of the machine had a chattel
mortgage covering it though it was in the possession of Rose. After
the destruction Rose assigned his entire interest in the policy to the
plaintiff. When the application was filled by Rose he informed Bowler
of the mortgage. Bowler, after receiving this information, proceeded
to fill out application and caused policy to be issued on same. Policy
issued had no mortgage clause, or indorsement, or rider attached re-
ferring to the incumbrance. In an action by the plaintiff on the
policy the defense is voiding of same because of the incumbrance.
Held, in reversing the decision of the lower court, which nonsuited
the plaintiff, that when an agent of an insurance company procures
the issuance of a policy after being informed of an incumbrance
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thereon, the company cannot thereafter take advantage of a provision
rendering the policy void because of the incumbrance. The question
of knowledge of the agent is a question of fact to go to the jury and
it is relevant evidence to introduce oral testimony to determine the-
point. Cassels v. S. Dakota Theshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 211 N. W.
805 (Sup. Ct. S. D. 1927).
In a case which presented an almost similar set of facts, the subject of
the insurance being an automobile, but where the agent received the
information after issuing the policy but prior to accepting the pre-
mium, the acceptance of the premium did not estop the insurer from
setting up the incumbrance provision as a defense to an action on the
policy when the loss occurred. Prose v. Hawkeye Sec. Fire Ins. Co.,
211 N. W. 970 (Sup. Ct. S. D. 1927).
The court apparently distinguishes the two cases upon a pro-vision
in the policy in the Prose case which does not allow an oral waiver
of condition. It is well settled that where a company retains the pre-
mium on a policy, knowing of an incumbrance, it waives a condition
that if there is an incumbrance on the subject the policy is void.
German-American Ins. Co. v. Yeagley, 163 Ind. 651, 71 N. E. 897
(1904); Cowart v. Capital City Ins. Co., 114 Ala. 356, 22 So. 574
(1897); Neafie v. Woodcock, 15 App. Div. 618, 44 N. Y. Supp. 768
(2nd Dept. 1897). It is also well settled that notice to a solicitor
authorized to deliver and issue policies for the company was notice to
the company. Rogers v. Farmers Mutual Aid, 106 Ky. 371, 50 S. W.
543 (1899); 2 Joyce Insurance (2nd Ed. 1917) 1126, Sec. 439. The
rule has been laid down in New York that the receipt by the com-
pany, through its general agent, of renewal premiums taken by him
with knowledge of other insurance, operates as a waiver of a condi-
tion requiring a formal notice and indorsement thereof on the policy,
although the policy provides that the conditions can only be waived
by a writing signed by the secretary, and it was also held that the
waiver might be by parol. Carroll v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 40 Barb.
(N. Y.) 292 (1863). It is conceded that in the Prose case the ap-
pellant did not have knowledge of the mortgage at the time of the
issuance of the policy, but at the time of acceptance of the premium,
and that therefore the acceptance works an estoppel against the for-
feiture. Lawyer v. Globe Mut. Ins. Co., 25 S. D. 549, 127 N. W.. 615
(1910). The court, however, read a statute into the facts upon which
they declared it would be contrary to the settled rule of the state to
attribute such knowledge to the company. A New York decision laid
down a rule that a distinction must be drawn between an existing
fact which renders a policy void when delivered and the omission of
the insured to give notice of and procure the required consent to a
subsequent act, which by its conditions invalidated it, although pre-
viously consented to. Gray v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 155 N. Y. 180,
49 N. E. 675 (1898). Such a distinction might be recognized in the
two principal cases. In the first, the agent by waiving the condition
gave the contract a valid inception, and in the second, by subsequent
acceptance of the premium, after knowledge of the breach of 'the
condition.
SPECIFIC PERFORIMANCE-W¥HAT CONSTITUTES PERFORMANCE SUFFI-
CIENT To TAKE CONTRACT OUT OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUD.-Deceased
orally agreed that the plaintiff should have her home on her death in
